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CONTINUING DISCUSSION
A Still More Catholic Quakerism
KELVIN VAN NUYS
Of the various claims for “The Future of Quakerism” made
in the Autumn 1966 issue of Quaker Religious Thought, let
me restate the highest ones: Quakerism as a vanguard, heading
the creative advance of Christianity — or even of the general
religious quest; and “Catholic Quakerism,” an all-sided, inclu
sive religion, adequate to the whole of human needs. Roland
Bainton remarks that Quakerism can only claim to unique
adequacy through being a “combination of ingredients, each
discoverable somewhere else.” Everett Cattell admits that
Quakerism won’t become the answer by any amount of re
examination of heritage alone, but that God is looking for a
people who have a deeper understanding of the “agonies of
today’s questions.” Maurice Creasey says we need “something
much deeper than a unanimous doctrinal statement or an
agreed program of action. It is a vision of... response... to
the needs of the present time.” Lewis Benson and Canby Jones
stress the need of a “new and dynamic understanding.”
‘I’hese statements seem to show readiness for creative re
sponse to new needs and for new inclusions. My only question
is whether they are “catholic” enough to envisage incorporation
of our scientific world-view at the cost of reconstruction not to
Luther’s, not to Wesley’s, not to Fox’s degree, but to Paul’s
and Augustine’s degree. That means going back of Paul and
Augustine to change their assumptions of Greek static philos
ophy, which Protestant reformers never touched. It means
reconsidering such ideas as “perfect being,” dualism between
spirit and matter, evil as privation, predestination, God as pre
eminently concerned with original or final perfection. But it
also means sounder support for some other orthodox claims:
cosmic theism, God as active in history, concrete revelation,
sin and salvation, to name a few.
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Quakerism of all sects has the best grounds for working
at solutions that are not just “returns” or “recoveries,” but are
genuinely creative. But although Canby Jones’ review of Lewis
Benson’s Catholic Quakerism speaks of “new and dynamic
understanding,” it is, mainly, of “the origins of the Quaker
movement,” and there is an insistence on the, at first sight,
non-creative categories of “obedience” and “perfection.” The
other writers in the Autumn 1966 issue seem to be thinking
primarily of specifically religious sources and social questions
for Quakerism’s expanded pioneering. Only Harold Loukes
is quoted as mentioning the necessity for “theory,” for theol
ogy, for “ratiocination” which “Friends have not significantly
engaged in.” This “neglect of general principles [is] the
Quaker weakness,” he admits. But then he goes on to empha
size the unique, special message of Quakerism, rather than its
inclusive one. So I remain unsure whether anyone is sufficiently
explicit about the need of being catholic with the greatest body
of cumulative, structured knowledge man has ever possessed.
I have become convinced that the scientific world-view in
its most modern dynamic formulation has changed from being
a threat to religious affirmations to being a better foundation
for them than man has ever had. It is likely that the central
event of modern history is the dynamizing of basic categories
of thought, fact, and value. Quakerism, I believe, cannot be
released from the task of making a much more thorough-going
Ieace with evolutionary and relativistic, Einsteinian science
than it has yet done. There are also in this “process meta
physics” tools for rapprochement between humanistic and
theistic-Christological minds promising that each, with modi
fication, might include both the valid claims of the other and
this world-picture of dynamic science.
For Quakerism really to be a catholic vanguard for relig
ion in our day, it must have answers to some pressing modern
c1uestions — which it, and Christianity in general, have hereto
fore just taken for granted, or condemned, or answered glibly
with such phrases as “incomprehensible paradox” and “divine
mystery.” Perhaps the two most insistent questions are: why,
if there is an omnipotent God, would he create an imperfect,
33
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evolving world, and why would he create man as a biological
creature with his very spirit involved in protoplasmic structures?
A theology more thoroughly in tune with the science of
fields of energy, organism, and creativity, though out of tune
with Greek philosophy, would be able to support many tradi
tional and Quaker beliefs, which I will itemize below. It gets
to these beliefs by a route that humanists can accept (only they
don’t pursue it to the end); and it makes evangelicals face up
to what “oninipotence” when taken together with “sin and sal
vation’’ really implies, which they too fail to pursue to the end.
I am asserting, then, that the modern intellectual scene
demands of any current religion of power, changes in thought
modes as fundamental as those made by Paul and Augustine.
That is, it demands the deportation of Greek static science
which they imported into Christianity, and a more thorough
deportation thaim orthodox, existentialist, or positivist has yet
accomplished.
The main reason is this: the static starting-point always
gives us a God and a Christ grappling with evil and change
they never intended. Modern man is through with all gods
who are described as having intended static perfection either
first or last, but who find themselves caught in a dynamically
imperfect world of effort and transformation instead. Modern
man is also through with the supposed explanation that this
situation is entirely man’s fault, through his freely chosen fall.
Psychology proves to our satisfaction that man was not perfect
in origin, nor could he help it.
On our campus we have recently seen Brecht’s play, The
Good Woman of Setzuan, complaining once more, as Western
literature has been doing for a century, of gods who propose
absolute perfection as man’s origin and goal, but have no real
answer why or how “good women” (or men) find themselves
trapped in evil, forced by life into strategies that mix soft
ness and toughness, vice and virtue, ambiguous experimenting.
Once again this play rejects the thesis that any god could
have meant man to be in problems, experimenting for solu
tions; that the little processes of partial resolutions, and the
big process of redemptive transformation, are themselves what
God purposely intended to create. God intended neither the
34
original innocence of Adam nor final saintly perfection, but the
creativity itself. If God meant that, then He had to have meant
disorder, evil, created it on purpose. This thought has been
touched upon again and again, by Job, Boehme, Blake, Fichte,
Goethe, D. H. Lawrence, Jung, Dewey, Whitehead, but never
accepted by any official Christian body as part and parcel of
any possible thcodicy. Back to static Greek substance, to Aristo
telian immutable perfect divinity, has all Christian thought
run in time pinch, to r;he unanswerably the problem of evil
over again, arid to multiply the skeptics and atheists whom it
has ta ugh ever to d ernand static perfection in God’s work,
before they will believe.
Ouakerism is w-orst of all. Perfection has been its favorite
word’ (Lewis Bensons and Canby Jones’ ‘‘perfectability” is
not so bad, is they would be very careful to mean continuous
transformation for the better, but not no-further-work.) Quaker
p_if.:ctionisrn and Nicbuhrian realism have been in an unnec
essary fight for decades for lack of a truly dynamic theory of
value, which could easily include both emphases. The Niebuhr
ian approach, in its extreme fear that the slightest thought of
perfection will tempt you to claim it, thus committing the
supremely static sin of pride, has tended toward a perverse dis
couragement of the process of transforming before it even
begins. It emphasizes man’s sinfulness, but in implying that it
is metaphysically unnecessary, it always leaves us with an un
warranted sense of disdain, ruefulness, a secret resentment of
God and man that they should have let things “get away” from
the original goodness. Publicly, this neo-orthodox view con
fesses, as did Augustine anti traditional Christianity, that it is
all a “paradox,” an incomprehensible mystery, why omnipo
tently good (i.e., statically, Greekly perfect) God should ever
have got Himsci involved in such a mess. This view ends by
covertly despising man, ridiculing him for his gratuitous evil.
But the Quaker promise of perfection in the end also
leaves the transforming itself without essential significance. If
you grant that final unchanging perfection is possible at all,
you then can never get rid of the question why omnipotent,
good God didn’t make it at once, in the beginning. But the
modern mind has begun to see that the dream of perfection at
I
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either beginning or end has no factual locus, at least in experi
ence. It behooves religion therefore to supply a meaning for
these facts, it cannot continue to consider as the only real
content of belief that “someday the repair of God’s botched
creation will be finished.”
Only a religion that understands eternal, dynamic, creative,
redemptive process as the eternal intent of God can hope to
undercut modern cynicism, and thence be effective in our dis
integrating world. Such an understanding requires for its
ultimate foundation a dynamic idea of goodness or value. No
other idea will do for the modern theodicicai task. It means
that goodness can exist, can be embodied by any god, only as
the very feeling of organizing, resolving process while it is in
the act of taking place. And if good can only be known as
felt in such process, then there must forever be problems, im
perfections, difficulties, maladjustments to be resolved; there
must forever be aspiration, search, effort, strategy; there must
forever be partial resolution, salvation, redemption. If need
and resolving process were ever to be completely overcome (by
perfection) there would be no good any more. Once and for
all you’ve got to be able to tell the scoffing ones that evil and
problem, which evolving, experiencing creatures must engage,
are not anomalous interferences, lapses from God’s original
intention, but are precisely His meaningful intention — not a
temporary intention either, but an eternal intention, necessary
as long as good is to exist. Only the dynamic idea of good
permits this assertion.
In the remainder of this paper I will suggest some aspects
of both humanism and Christian theism that a thorough accept
ance of dynamism would imply, thus furthering a rapproch
ment between them. Here the suggestions can be hardly more
than hints. A fuller treatment can be found in my book, Is
Reality Meaningful?, Philosophical Library, 1966.
1. Cosmic divine purpose. Modern field theory can be
argued as supporting the purposiveness of all energy, the possi
bility of the universe as a unified field or whole with some pur
posive regulation of its parts, the relevance of all reality to
human existence. There is enough implication of cosmic pur
pose, at any rate, so that humanists have no right to exclude
any consideration of the cosmic dimension.
2. Mystical experience of God. Field energy theory is at
least harmonious enough with the idea of cosmic consciousness
so that again there are no grounds for rejection of knowledge
at this level out of hand. Questions about the “objective cor
relate” may remain, but there is no need of a humanist inter
dict on Quakerism’s mystical emphasis.
3. Original perfection of creation or of man seems negated.
if good exists only in transformation, God must have created
the need of transformation. This opposes both orthodox inno
cence of Adam and humanist-Rousseauian “natural, original
goodness” of man.
4. But dynamic theology, though rejecting original per.
fection, does not have to reject a certain interpretation of fall
and sin. All of human evil, that is, does not have to be blamed
on God. Man’s fall and sin would be his refusal to enter upon
the transformation or salvation process, his choice to remain
in the original, God-given imperfection. This imperfection
would then become man’s own fault because he has now chosen
it. His further inevitable regression and consequent worsening
would not have to be blamed on God. It would partly be
God’s attempt to stimulate him into creative growth, partly
deserved punishment for being static. Pride as the arch-sin
(refusal to change), humility as the arch-virtue (readiness to
change) would fit well into this approach.
5. Transformation or salvation of man would be supported,
as against any humanist over-confidence in man’s already exist
ent goodness and power. Divine aid in this process would not
be precluded. Humanists may argue that man can save him
self, but they would be unjustified in any dogmatic rejection of
theist-Christological claims that it requires divine aid. How
ever, both views would have to stop thinking in terms of
“return to essence, ““recovery of man’s true self,” or even
“potential goodness,” if this is interpreted to mean a goodness
that is som2how already fully present underneath. It can only
be a goodness that is truly created now, existentially. And
creation means creation in the dynamic logic; it does not mean
return, nor uncovering what is already there. It means a God
J
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who is really doing something now, not one who did it at the
beginning, anti is merely duplicating His act now. In real
creativity we do not just copy a blueprint; that is mere fatalism.
6. Divine foreknowledge and predestination seem negated
by the concept of genuine creative solving of present problems.
For existence to be merely an unrolling of something already
existent in God’s mind becomes a rather flat, childish idea as
compared with authentic adventurous coping with actual prob
lems, both for God and man.
7. Christ olog’t. The dynamic approach would obviously
support Quakerism’s maximum emphasis on the present living
Christ, the Inner Light of continumg revelation, the presently
acting Holy Spirit. Canby Jones’ phrases in his review of Lewis
Benson: “redemption,” “constant re-creation by Christ,” “the
constantly renewed Christ event,” would be consonant unless
we suspect all those ‘re-” words of meaning only repetition of
something already done, or restoration to what once was, rather
than real solving work being done right now.
The dynamic metaphysics, as process theologians are more
and more boldly pointing out, is clearly required for under
standing the Old Testament God who constantly tackles emer
gencies, changes His strategy (the Noah story), revises His
plans, responds to prayer. The Greek foundation always made
these things incomprehensible. The New Testament in the
main continues to illustrate a continuously acting, modifying
God, the Christ event being the greatest illustration.
There is an implication from dynamism to the preeminent
reality of the concrete, which provides an avenue Christologists
could justifiably ask humanists to take more seriously, over to
accepting particular concrete events in history as conceivably
God’s central concern, rather than the scientific abstractions
humanists are tempted to worship instead. On the other hand,
humanists could ask Christologists to guard against letting
wrangling over shades of opinion about what happened in
poorly recorded times of long ago become of more concern
than present life for religion; and to permit modes of expression
which reveal enriching parallels between modern experience
and science and the traditional terms.
38
8. Lewis Benson’s and Canby Jones’ labeling man’s chief
relationship to Christ by the term “obedience” gives oppor
tunity for a short semple discussion of how the dynamic criter
ion might affect our decisions on terminology. “Obedience”
would, at first sight, be suspect for suggesting static conformity
to a given model as the main content of religion. Of course,
if it may be allowed to mean obedience to God’s intention that
we enter effortfully into the creative search and transformation,
all right. If it means obedience to a preestablished fixed code
of rules supposedly ordered priorly by God or Christ, we would
suspect it again, as Paul did. But if you mean by the priori)’
ordered rule, the law of love, and mean by that the intention
to seek fresh solutions to specific problems of human need and
relationship, all right again. Yet the word so strongly connotes
conformity to fixed commands, that I can’t quite accept it as a
key word in our religion. Nor does it seem well calculated to
recommend our message to the modern minds we should be
trying to attract.
This last point goes triply for Canby Jones’ phrase,
“Lamb’s War,” against which he knows I have been conducting
a vendetta for some time. With shepherding being the minute
part of today’s culture that it is, it does not seem that to make
Quakerism widely understood today one should stress such a
remote symbol, particularly since half of it contradicts, at first
sight, one of Quakerism’s most distinctive emphases. How
quaint, how scjuare it must sound to the generation we would
like to win.
9. Faith and hope would obviously be central virtues for
dynamism as the bases of aspirational effort.
10. Final perfection, final disappearance of all problem and
evil, seems negated by the dynamic idea of good, as discussed
above. And does promising that “all evils will be overcome”
really do any good for a modern religion? Does a mature mind
want to indulge any more in this kind of talk, two thousand
years after the first promise of the end? Does it shift the relig
ious quest too much over into the unreal? Of course if we
mean that the evils and problems that will eternally appear
can each in principle be creatively solved, there would be no
objection.
39
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For Quakerism, then, to be the catholic vanguard, it seems
abundantly clear that it would have to be the first religion that
thoroughly incorporated the dynamic world-view, and stood
for these strikingly orthodox conclusions as well as the unortho
dox ones that stem from it. If Quakerism wants to be today’s
movement of power, it must not only understand its essential
character from past history; but it must be in the forefront with
the new consensus which has been emerging now for almost a
century in dynamic scientific philosophy. Since Quakerism’s
central affirmations do have a head start in harmonizing with
that science, Quakers should take advantage of it, going even
farther than they have in creating an explicit harmony of sci
ence and religion.
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